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For nearly all of man's five thousand years of civilized existence, large
populations were considered a strategic asset. Indeed, until the last hundred
years, population was probably the single most important determinant of
national power and security. As early as the ancient Greeks, technological
and organizational innovations allowed advanced societies to dominate more
numerous but less-developed societies, but only if the population differential
was limited. Through most of history, no amount of technological progress
could balance a gross population disadvantage. Furthermore, when competing
societies maintained an approximately equal level of scientific and material
advancement, population was often the determinant of national dominance.
A large population has never been sufficient to guarantee great-power status,
but it does appear to be one necessary precondition. In fact, every great power
in history either had a relatively large population itself, or controlled the
economic production and manpower of large populations subservient to the
mother state. For all these reasons, it was generally accepted through all but
the last two centuries that population growth enhances national power and
security.
I.
In 1798 this view first came under sharp challenge. In that year, the Reverend
Thomas Malthus published his Essay on the Principles of Population. In it
he explained that population increases geometrically, and he argued that
because there is a limited amount of land available for cultivation, the
agricultural and other production that supports a population will be unable
to keep pace. When the rapidly increasing line of population meets the line
of resource availability, Malthus claimed, population level will be dampened
by "positive checks." These include famine, disease, and war. When a popula-
tion reaches a saturation point on the land that supports it, that population
will aggressively reach out for more land, which will lead to war. War, in
turn, will produce fatalities-reducing population-and perhaps fresh lands,
which could support future or transplanted population.
Malthus, through this work, became a prominent exponent of the idea that
population growth is a likely cause of war. We now know, as Malthus himself
began to suspect in his later writings, that the availability of land and other
national resources is by no means fixed, but is subject to constant expansion
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through technical advance and improved economic productivity. We also know
that Malthus underestimated man's ability to take control of population growth
by means other than the positive checks of war, disease, and famine. For
example, Malthus considered universal practice of birth control to be both
immoral and impracticable. He did not foresee its widespread application.
Although Malthus' theory has not withstood the test of time, his spirit has
nonetheless insinuated itself deeply into the modern mind. Following the
Malthusiap diagnosis, national demogogues have used population as both a
scapegoat and a justification for international violence. Before World War
II, German politicians claimed that Germany was overcrowded within its
existing borders and used population pressures as a pretext for expansion.
That claim does not stand up well in light of Germany's postwar experience,
where the Bundesrepublik, despite losing one-third of its territory and gain-
ing a 25 percent population increase via massive refugee influx from East
Germany, experienced a prolonged economic boom.
Nonetheless, the argument is seductive. As Harold Cox has written: "As
soon as a population grows big, its leaders say, 'Our people are so numerous
we must fight for more space.' As soon as war has taken place, the leaders
invert this appeal, and say: 'We must breed more people in preparation for
the next war'." Recognizing this tendency to rationalize conquest on
demographic grounds, Quincy Wright stresses that the historical record shows
''population situations and changes are never necessary causes of war."
Elsewhere in his classic exposition of the causes of war, Wright states that
it is not population change itself that spurs violence, but "the willingness of
people to accept unsound economic theories" as to population's effects. For
example, if one subscribes to the belief that the world economic pie is largely
fixed in size, any period of population increase will induce the alarming thought
that maintaining current living standards will require wresting resources away
from one's neighbors. A more balanced understanding of the relationship be-
tween population and economics, on the other hand, leads to the realization
that there are many alternatives to violence open to countries with growing
populations. These include intensification of agricultural production, increased
urbanization, increased industrialization, expanded foreign trade, and emigra-
tion, as well as others.
It is important to understand, however, that population increase does require
adaptation and adjustment by nations, and that if a country's benign responses
to growth are thwarted, it may resort to aggressive behavior. For example,
the United States and its Western Allies may bear some blame for Japan's
drift toward militarism and foreign adventure in the early twentieth century.
Japan's densely concentrated population grew rapidly from about 32 million
in 1850 to 75 million just before World War II. Yet emigration and expanded
foreign trade-two of the classic responses to the economic demands of popula-
tion growth-were increasingly closed off to Japanese leaders by Western pro-
tectionist trade barriers and Oriental-exclusion immigration laws.' That Japan
1. It is worrisome to consider that protectionist legislation and measures to constrict im-
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eventually turned to imperial conquest as a solution to its perceived over-
crowding is partly a result of short-sighted Western policies.
II.
Despite its obvious strains, population growth can produce clear benefits
to both national power and international peace. Population pressures, while
causing short-run turmoil, force innovations and productivity-enhancing
changes that enrich the nation. Population growth can sharply quicken the
pace of industrialization and break down social rigidities. The remarkable
growth in industry and technical progress that occurred in the United States,
Germany, Russia, and Japan around the turn of the twentieth century may
have been directly related to their high population growth. Conversely, the
less spectacular economic expansions in France and Italy may be partly related
to their more sluggish demographic change. 2
Nothing exists in U.S. history to indicate that rapid population growth is
incompatible with rapid economic expansion. After all, the population of the
U.S. went from 2.5 million in 1776 to 240 million today,3 while Gross Na-
tional Product (GNP) per capita increased 15-fold. Indeed, Alvin Hansen has
suggested that perhaps two-thirds of the growth of U.S. economic output up
until WW I was caused by population growth, either directly through increases
in labor supply, or indirectly through the productivity enhancements of mass
production. And, if population and economic output per person can be in-
creased simultaneously, the result will be a sharp increase in national power
and influence.
Likewise, the international results of growing population need not be
negative. The alleged relationship between Western population growth and
subsequent overseas colonization does not exist upon careful examination.
For example, France, a leading imperialist nation, had one of the slowest-
growing populations in Europe throughout its colonial epoch. Population
growth can, in truth, contribute to international peace and security because
of the accelerated international communication, travel, migration, trade, and
generally increased cultural interpenetration it brings. In fact, three periods
when the world's population increased most rapidly-the Roman era, the nine-
teenth century, and the post-WW II period--correspond with the Pax Romana,
the Pax Brittanica, and the Pax Americana.
III.
There is, then, no determinate relationship between population dynamics
and international conflict. Nonetheless, aspects of population change can create
migration once again enjoy wide support today. Congressional bills mandating each may well
be enacted before the end of the year.
2. This view is associated with Nobel Prize-winning economist Simon Kuznets, among others.
3. Calculations by W.S. Rossiter suggest that half of today's population was produced through
natural increase by the 2.5 million original settlers here at the time of the American Revolution.
The rest are newer immigrants and their descendants.
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security tensions within and between nations. One such aspect is differential
growth between ethnic groups. Evidence exists that as early as 25 B.C., com-
manders in the Roman army were carefully mixing and observing the various
non-Roman communal groups that made up an increasing portion of their
military. Subjugated peoples often become important parts of imperial armies,
for example, Italians in Rome, Cossacks in the Russian Tsarist cavalry, Kurds
in the Middle East, Punjabs and Gurkhas in the British Indian army. Some
of these ethnic groups became prized for their martial abilities and, like the
British Gurkhas or the Bedouins in Jordan's armed forces, continue to serve
prominently in national armies.
More often, though, minorities and outside ethnic groups are considered
to have a negative effect on national security. Throughout British military
history there were concerns about the loyalty of Irish and Scots troops. The
British naval mutinies of the late 1700s were perceived to be part of an Irish
conspiracy. In the 1740s there were mutinies in Scotland. In 1921 the Con-
naught Rangers, stationed in India, mutinied out of sympathy with Irish rebels.
It ig not just within military units that such problems arise. Disproportionate
rates of reproduction among ethnic groups within a country can create pro-
blems for national unity and thereby for national security. Ethnic and religious
differences, combined with the fear of one group demographically swamping
another, are the primary obstacles to Irish unification and the source of the
extended violence in Northern Ireland. Spanish Basques, Indian Sikhs, Sri
Lankan Tamils, Moros in the Philippines, Kurds in Iraq and Iran, and other
groups have sometimes been the center of national disputes, endangering securi-
ty. Africa is rife with often bloody struggles between competing tribal and
other pojbulation groups. Although ethnic schisms within the Belgian and Cana-
dian populations have not resulted in violence, they include language, cultural,
and religious differences that have produced serious problems.
The Canadian situation is of particular interest. The growth of the French-
speaking population in Canada is a classic example of the leverage that dif-
ferential birth rates can exert. In 1700 there were only about ten thousand
French-Canadians in Quebec. Families, however, tended to be extremely large.
Without benefit of further French immigration, the original French-Canadian
population expanded to more than a million by the 1870s. At that time they
constituted approximately 30 percent of the population. The French minority
was disaffected with British rule in Canada, and their attempt to extend their
power bloc and exert influence by demographic means became quite conscious.
It was referred to as the "revenge of the cradle." During the First World
War, the Canadian political system and military were severely strained by
resistance by the French-speaking" community to conscription and by
controversy over whether French-Canadians were contributing fully to the war
effort.
As the French-Canadian example suggests, the effect of demographic
dynamics on national security is not one-way. Just as demographics influence
national security, so too can a security threat influence demographics. One
of the best examples of this phenomenon is seen today in Israel. With a Jewish
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fertility rate of 2.7 children per woman, Israeli family size is well above the
level of other comparably developed nations. The birth rate of Israeli Jews
is also much higher than that of Jews living in developed countries outside
the Middle East. The siege mentality that has arisen after three major wars
in thirty-five years and the perceived need to bolster the state's Jewish popula-
tion in light of that situation are factors that contribute to the relatively high
rates of reproduction of Israel's Jews. (Similar factors may explain the very
high birth rate of Israel's resident Palestinians-6.4 children per woman.)
Another country with interesting ethnic demographics is the Soviet Union.
The various constituent nationalities within the USSR have sharply different
fertility rates, with important national security implications. After the Bolshevik
Revolution, three-quarters of the Soviet population was Russian. Today, less
than 50 percent is Russian. In the future, that fraction will shrink even more.
This is a result of two divergent trends: the low birth rates of Russians (two
children per woman), and the extremely high birth rates of Soviet Asians in
the Moslem republics (4-5 children per woman). Radio Liberty-overseer Ben
Wattenberg reports that Soviet Asians privately refer to this as "victory in
the bedroom."
At least two-thirds of the non-Russian population is not fluent in the Russian
language. About 90 percent of the Soviet officer corps is Russian, but the
rank-and-file soldiers necessarily reflect the ethnic composition of the popula-
tion at large. Even if Russian Red Navy commanders succeed in training Uzbek
conscripts to operate a submarine below polar ice, one can be sure that reduced
military cohesiveness will result from the growing ethnic divisions within the
Soviet armed forces.
Leaders in the Soviet Union and other multiethnic countries express hope
that over time, universal education, mass communication, and other
homogenizing influences of modern life will erase ethnic distinctions and
rivalries. This, however, has not been the recent global experience. Ethnic
identifications have shown remarkable vitality and have often seemed to acquire
new force from precisely those aspects of modernity that were supposed to
dissolve them. The Iranians are only one group who reacted to the standard-
izing influences of modern life by strongly reasserting the distinctive aspects
of their national culture.
Sometimes, a population's ethnic identity may endure, and even deepen,
over time by mutating creatively. As Cynthia Enloe has pointed out, there
are fascinating examples from recent history that suggest that modern political
conditions can lead to the establishment of fundamentally new ethnic forms,
which transcend or blend other tribal, religious, or regional identifications.
Blacks in South Africa, for example, are a diverse group who have only recently
begun to think of themselves as a united group, in response to their common
opposition to white minority rule. Likewise, Sephardim in Israel come from
a wide range of nations and backgrounds, and they have only begun to define
themselves as a bloc in the last few decades, in contraposition to Israel's
Ashkenazi. It was not until the Ibo and Hausa were established as competing
factions in modern-day Nigeria that they reached their current level of ethnic
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solidarity. Likewise, Rwanda's Hutu are a relatively recent ethnic amalgam,
growing up in response to new demographic and political conditions.
IV.
Ethnic and religious groups can be expected to remain important factors
in the development of national unity and in the protection of national security
and international peace. But, of course, for countries and for ethnic groups
within countries, numerical strength is only one aspect of power. Former CIA
Deputy Director Ray Cline has devised a formula for rating the international
power and influence of nations. This formula suggests that population size
per se does not contribute more than 10 percent to the total power quotient.
Population's overall importance, however, is much greater because of its secon-
dary effects on economic and military strength, the other material variables
in Cline's formula.
Larger populations produce larger GNPs, and brute economic production
is a critical.aspect of national strength and security. Larger and denser popula-
tions also can more easily build the infrastructure of industry, transport, com-
munications, all of which support national defense in some ways. Power is,
in some ways, related to the number of railroad cars, cyclotrons, hospitals, elec-
tric plants, and universities a nation possesses. Additionally, only larger popula-
tions have tax bases broad enough to support the construction of aircraft car-
riers, submarines, and missle defense systems. Further, attaining technological
leadership requires collecting a large critical mass of scientists, and only a substan-
tial consumer market can support broad industrial innovation and a major
research and development sector. In none of these areas is a large population
alone enough to produce success, but in each instance, a bigger nation may
have a strategic advantage." In fact, demographer Kingsley Davis has sug-
gested that no nation without a large population can hope for great-power
status. The advantages of a large labor force, the economies of scale and
production, and a big army are simply too important.
The benefits of large or increased population accrue most clearly to nations
that are already developed. But even very poor or disorganized large nations
must be taken seriously in global calculations of power. China and India,
for example, both have per capita GNPs of under $300, but because of their
hordes of soldiers, the aggregated size of the economic production, and the
difficulty of subduing such large populations through invasion, they are ac-
corded national power completely out of proportion to their level of
development.'
4. It should be acknowledged that in some cases, there may be countervailing disadvantages;
for example, increased social pressures, environmental stress, and possible economic problems
(such as labor oversupply), to go with the national security benefits of expanded population.
Deciding whether an extra increment of population is an asset or a liability depends on each
nation, and sometimes on whether the matter is viewed from the collective or the individual
perspective. This paper, however, must generalize for most nations and is concerned only with
population's power and security effects, judged from the national interest.
5. One of the clearest indications of this is the Soviets' positioning of more than fifty troop
divisions on or near the Chinese border.
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The experience of the U.S. Civil War illustrates that a larger population
and stronger economic base can contribute a great deal toward overpowering
superior military prowess. Likewise, America's logistical advantage over the
Japanese, calculated at 10 to 1 by the Japanese, outweighed disadvantages
of surprise and preparation in the Pacific during World War II. Clearly,
modern military technology can go a long way in helping compensate for an
inferior population level, as the Israelis-a nation of 4 million surrounded
by more than 100 million hostile or potentially hostile neighbors-have
demonstrated. It must be remembered, however, that if not for the special
nature of its relationship with the United States, a nation as small as Israel
would never be able to afford the sophisticated weapons that are the only
thing between its trim fighting force and destruction. The United States provides
Israel with credits and subsidies of several billion dollars per year-nearly
$1,000 per Israeli citizen. Even so, the Israelis must still devote 30 percent
of their GNP to defense. Israel, therefore, can hardly be taken as a general
model for overcoming the national security disadvantages of low population.
Besides, most nations cannot assume they will have a technological advan-
tage over their rivals, and when industrial standing is similar, population level
becomes a vital differentiator of national power. It can be extremely destabiliz-
ing when traditional competitors suddenly enter onto divergent demographic
paths. The French certainly felt that the balance of power was shifted fatally
against them when their population dramatically slowed its growth in the
late nineteenth century, while that of their European competitors continued
upward. France went from a position of considerable advantage over the
British, the Germans, and the Austro-Hungarians to being inferior in size
to all three by the early 1890s. This period of demographic decline corresponded
closely with the fall of French national power and influence. Similarly, the
Germans felt considerably disadvantaged because of their failure to keep pace
with the growth of the Russian population.
V.
Today, the most striking demographic asymmetry with global-power im-
plications involves the Soviet Union and the United States. The Soviets, with
low birth rates in the European republics, high birth rates in the Asian republics,
and a moderately high net result, have substantial population growth ahead.
At current rates, the Soviet Union will go from a population of 275 million
people to a population of close to 400 million by the end of the next century.
At the same time, the U.S.-at current rates-will crest and then decline to
about 260 million, not much higher than today's 240 million. Most impor-
tant, because the U.S. has had below-replacement-level birth rates for more
than a decade, it will then be shrinking from its 260 million base at the rate
of about half a million per year. (It takes 2.1 children per couple to keep
a population stable. The U.S. now averages 1.8 children per couple, 15 per-
cent below that minimum level.) The two superpowers will go from a posi-
tion of rough population parity to a 3-to-2-and-growing Soviet advantage.
The effect of the shift, if it comes to pass, is impossible to predict, but
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it will be to the American dis'advantage.6 One of the most likely national
security effects would be the reinstatement of the draft. The Soviet Union
has had a draft since World War II. It allows them to pay their 4.5 million
soldiers an average of only a few dollars per month. The United States had
a draft from 1939 to 1973. In 1973 the U.S. armed forces totaled 2.3 million
persons. Today there are 2.1 million volunteers in the American military.
Recruits are attracted by salary and payments comparable to incomes in the
private sector of the U.S. economy, making expenses necessarily quite high.
The American military now totals about 7.6 percent of men aged 18 to
30. Because of low U.S. birth rates, by 2085 a military the same size as to-
day's would consume 10.2 percent of available American men aged 18 to 30.
That is a 35 percent increase. In order to achieve that larger share, the U.S.
will either have to institute a fairly large draft or raise military pay to levels
high enough to lure enlistees from the private sector. That would mean a
sharp increase in defense spending (personnel costs currently comprise ap-
proximately two-thirds of the defense budget).
The alternative to a large draft or high defense budget is to maintain armed
force levels at the same fraction of the 18- to 30-year-old male population as
today. In that case, the United States' total armed forces would fall to 1.6
million. And, of course, if the United States wanted to match the strength
of the then-much-larger Soviet Union (with a military force of between 6 and
7 million), it would probably need both a draft and enormous increases in
defense spending, in sum, a permanent militarization of American society.
In Roman times, below-replacement birth rates and the fear of national
security consequences led Caesar to award bounties to large families and stirred
Emperor Augustus to issue the Lex Julia and the Lex Papia, a remarkable
series of pronatalist edicts. Population decline also possibly contributed to
the decay of the Greek and Venetian empires. Barring an increase in the birth
rate, perhaps in tandem with expanded immigration, this may also become
a serious problem for American national security.
6. Just the same, it should be pointed out that the Soviets have population problems of
their own. In addition to the ethnic strains outlined above, these include high levels of family
breakup, growing juvenile delinquency and crime, an extremely high abortion rate in the European
republics (more than six per woman per lifetime), poor regional distribution of population, and
endemic alcoholism (cited in more than half of all divorce petitions). Many of these problems
can have negative effects on health, worker productivity, and ultimately national security. For
example, alcoholism has become'so rampant that it has actually led recently to sharp drops in
national life expectancy, an unprecedented occurrence for a modern developed country.
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